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Introduction: 
 In 2008, Oregon was given permission by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) to expand the State’s Medicaid program (Oregon Health Plan Standard) by 
lottery (Allen, et al. 2010).  This allowed for a randomized control study focused on the effect of 
Medicaid coverage on various factors.  The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (OHIE) was 
conducted to capitalize on this rare event (Allen, et al. 2010, Finkelstein, et al. 2012, Taubman, 
et al. 2014).   
 Previous studies using OHIE have focused on the many changes Medicaid coverage had 
on health, hospital use, financial outcomes, and wellbeing (Finkelstein, et al. 2012, Taubman, et 
al. 2014, Baicker, et al. 2013).  This paper studies the effect of Medicaid coverage on emergency 
department (ED) use and costs.  It focuses on the heterogeneity between individuals without 
Medicaid and those with Medicaid.  Specifically, the research is centered on six subgroups 
generated from survey responses.  By focusing on these subgroups it allows for a better 
understand of what factors are associated with changes in ED use and costs.  The subgroups are: 
(1) usual place for medical care – clinic, (2) received care at a primary care clinic, (3) currently 
taking any prescription medications, (4) currently owe money for medical expenses, (5) 
borrowed money/skipped bills to pay health care costs, (6) been refused care because owe money 
for past treatment.  For each subgroup some individuals received Medicaid and some individuals 
did not.  Analysis focused on how those individuals with Medicaid utilized ED differently than 
individuals who did not receive Medicaid.   
By sorting by survey response and due to the randomized control set up, the research 
provides an opportunity to establish the causal effect of Medicaid coverage within each 
subgroup.  Most notably there was an increased number of ED visits by individuals with 
Medicaid in all subgroups.  The largest of which was 193 percent increase in ED visits by 
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individuals with Medicaid and reported being refused care because they owed money for past 
treatment.  Focusing just on ED visits that were primary care preventable, a similar increase in 
use occurred due to Medicaid coverage.  Interestingly, individuals who reported receiving care at 
a primary care clinic used the ED for primary care preventable needs 109 percent more than 
similar individuals without Medicaid.  Non-emergent ED visits also increased with Medicaid 
coverage.  Overall ED costs were higher for individuals with Medicaid coverage, but analysis of 
cost per ED visit did not show a statistical significance in increasing or decreasing ED costs per 
visits with Medicaid coverage.     
 A greater understanding of the causal effect of Medicaid is vital with the unprecedented 
expansion of Medicaid under the auspice of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
Previous research utilizing survey data and quasi-experimental design was limited to only 
establishing correlation (Smulowitz, et al. 2011, Kasper, Giovannini and Hoffman 2000, Ginde, 
Lowe and Wiler 2012, Capp, et al. 2013).  Proponents of the Affordable Care Act often claim 
that an expansion of Medicaid to uninsured low-income individuals will relieve the strain on 
emergency departments and costs.  This relies heavily on primary care services serving as 
substitutes for more costly ED services.  However, Medicaid also reduces the personal cost of 
ED visits and could increase ED use if ED use is a normal good.  A normal good is one in which 
an increase in wealth (effective wealth increases with Medicaid coverage) causes an increase 
demand for the good.  
 
Literature Review: 
 The most significant research regarding the effect of Medicaid coverage on ED use was 
conducted by Taubman and others (2014).  Their research analyzed the same data set used in this 
study and found that Medicaid increases ED use.  The marginal effect of Medicaid coverage for 
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the entire sample was 41% and the mean value in the control group was 1.022 ED visits.  An 
instrumental variable approach was utilized to estimate Medicaid coverage for their study.  This 
study utilized the same instrumental variables (winning the lottery and household size).  
However, Taubman and others (2014) research is different in many aspects.  It looked at 
three major subgroups created by the number of ED visits in the pre-randomization period, 
hospital admission type and timing, and type of ED visit.  Their research also compared self-
reported (survey response) ED data to hospital administrative data.  In the supplemental 
materials they also looked at the heterogeneity of ED use on the following sub-populations: 
gender, age, smoking habits, pre-lottery diagnosis, race, education, prior financial status, and 
timing of lottery sign up.   
In most cases Medicaid coverage increase ED use (Taubman, et al. 2014).  However, for 
gender and age they suggested that there was also heterogeneity within individuals with 
Medicaid coverage.  They reported that “the increase in emergency-department use is larger for 
men than for women; there is some evidence of larger increases for younger individuals than for 
older individuals”.  For each subpopulation they estimated the effect of Medicaid coverage 
twice; one model for men (or older individuals) and another model for women (or younger 
individuals).  The marginal effect of Medicaid coverage on ED visits for men was 0.484 and the 
marginal effects of Medicaid coverage on ED  visits for women was 0.331.  Also the marginal 
effect of Medicaid coverage on ED visits for younger individuals (49 and younger) was 0.502 
and the marginal effects of Medicaid coverage on ED visits for older individuals (50 and older) 
was 0.175.  This study challenges their claim that with Medicaid coverage men used the ED 
more than women with Medicaid coverage and younger individuals more than older individuals 
by utilizing a different linear model approach. 
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Taubman and others (2014) research is the most recent randomized control study that 
analyzed the effect insurance coverage had on ED use.  The RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
conducted in the 1970s utilized a randomized assignment of copay levels and measured the 
heterogeneity between copay levels (Newhouse 1993, Aron-Dine, Einav and Finkelstein 2013).  
The RAND study found that the more comprehensive the insurance (i.e., lower copay levels) the 
greater use of the ED.  One limitation of the RAND study is the difference between the private 
insurance provided by the study and Medicaid insurance provided today by states.  The 
importance of analyzing the effect of Medicaid coverage on ED use is the current expansion of 
Medicaid coverage by the Affordable Care Act.    
 In 2011, research conducted by Smulowitz and others (2011) focused on the expansion of 
health insurance as a result of the Massachusetts Health Reform.  They analyzed ED visits from 
11 hospitals before and after the Massachusetts Health Reform took effect in 2006.  They found 
a slight drop in the rate of “low-severity” ED visits.  However, this was not a randomized control 
study and was not able to establish the causal effect that health insurance expansion has on ED 
use. 
 Research by Kasper and others (2000) utilized longitudinal data to analyze how health 
care use changed for individuals that either gained insurance or lost insurance during the study.  
A more recent study by Ginde and others (2012) employed a longitudinal study and focused 
specifically on how ED visits differed for individuals who had continuous health insurance from 
individuals who gained health insurance during the study.  Their research found that individuals 
who gained insurance were associated with increased ED use.  They predicted that with the 
changing health care landscape there would be a surge in ED use. 
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 Lastly, Capp and others (2013) used a cross-sectional study of ED use from the 2011 
National Health Interview Survey to analyze how self-perceived severity of a health care need 
was associated with health insurance type.  Their research found that it was not self-perceived 
severity of a health care need that increased ED use but rather lacking access to non-ED care that 
increased ED use.  They suggested that Medicaid insurance should address this lack of access to 
non-ED care in order to reduce ED use.   
 
Data: 
In 2008, there were approximately 90,000 individuals who enrolled in the lottery 
(Finkelstein, et al. 2012).  However, the OHIE focused on only 74,922 individuals (Finkelstein, 
et al. 2012) (Taubman, et al. 2014).  Those left out were excluded to due to: multiple entry, not 
eligible for OHP Standard (out of state address, not 18-64, died before the lottery), eligible for 
Medicare before the end of the experiment, and/or had an institutional address.  There were 
29,834 individuals who were chosen in the lottery and were able to apply for OHP Standard.  
This resulted in 45,088 individuals who were not allowed to apply (see Table 1). Table 1 also 
reports for the entire OHIE how many individuals received Medicaid coverage (18,013) and how 
many individuals did not (56,909).  In addition to the entire OHIE, Table 1 also reports the 
number of individuals by Medicaid coverage and lottery for each of the eight additional 
subgroups (discussed later in paper). 
Two mail surveys were sent to 58,405 individuals at the start of the lottery and 12 months 
after (denoted as 0M and 12M respectively) (Finkelstein, et al. 2012).  Of the 58,405, there were 
29,589 who were selected in the lottery and 28,816 who were not selected in the lottery.  An 
additional survey was sent out at six months (6M) but it just included individuals (11,756) who 
responded early to the 0M survey.  The surveys had varying response rates (see Table 2 for 
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response rates and the supplementary materials accompanying the NBER dataset1 for a full 
description of the survey methods).  These three mail surveys were used to generate the six 
subgroups used for the heterogeneity study.  Table 3 shows the survey questions used and how 
the responses were used to create the subgroups. 
In addition to the mail surveys, the OHIE research focused on 12 hospitals in the Portland 
area.  ED visits information was collected and matched with 29,646 individuals in the broader 
lottery study (Taubman, et al. 2014).  Of the 29,646, there were 9,624 individuals chosen from 
the lottery and 15,020 who were not (see Table 1).  However, due to privacy concerns some 
information was censored from the publicly available dataset (see the supplementary materials 
accompanying the NBER dataset).  This study used five variables as dependent variables in the 
analysis.  They are: (1) number of ED visits, (2) number of primary care preventable ED visits, 
(3) number of non-emergent ED visits, (4) total ED costs, (5) costs per ED visit (see Table 4 for 
summary statistics of dependent variables). 
 
Research Methods: 
 This research focuses on the heterogeneity between having Medicaid (OHP Standard) or 
not.  However, the randomized control study did not assign Medicaid to individuals.  The lottery 
allowed individuals to sign up, but individuals who did not win the lottery could also have 
obtained Medicaid during the study.  For example, some women who became pregnant and some 
individuals who became disabled also obtained Medicaid.  For the purpose of thoroughness it 
was important to use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal relationship 
                                                          
1 Finkelstein, Amy. Oregon Health Insurance Experiment Public Use Data, 2013. Available at 
http://www.nber.org/oregon/data.html. 
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Medicaid coverage had on ED use and costs.  Lottery and household size were the instruments 
used to estimate Medicaid coverage.  Household size was included as all individuals from the 
same household were allowed to apply for Medicaid even if just one individual was selected 
during the lottery (Taubman, et al. 2014).  This created an unequal chance of obtaining Medicaid 
for larger households than smaller households.  The following equation demonstrate how 
Medicaid coverage was instrumented for: 
 Medicaid Coverage = α0 + α1*Lottery  + α2*Household Size + ε   (1) 
 The analysis of Medicaid coverage on ED use and costs included six different subgroups 
based on survey responses.  There were 10,454 individuals from the 29,646 individuals in the 
Portland ED sample that also responded to at least one of the surveys.  However, the response 
rate varied across the six different subgroups.  Thus a unique Medicaid coverage estimate was 
created for each subgroup (see Table 5). 
 The research focused on studying the effects of Medicaid coverage within six subgroups.  
Taubman and others (2014) included analysis of the heterogeneity of physical and social 
subgroups.  These included gender, age, smoking habits, pre-lottery diagnosis, race, education, 
prior financial status, and timing of lottery sign up (Taubman, et al. 2014).  This study focuses on 
surveyed responses to create subgroups in an attempt to get at the reason for the increase in ED 
use with Medicaid.  Six survey questions included were: (1) usual place for medical care-clinic, 
(2) received care at a primary care clinic, (3) currently taking medication, (4) currently owe for 
past treatment, (5) borrowed/skipped bills to pay for health care bills, and (6) had been refused 
care because they owed for prior treatment.  Each of these subgroups was created by aggregating 
the survey responses from 0M, 6M, and 12M surveys.  Thus individuals in the ‘yes’ category 
reported at least one time across the three surveys that they had this occur to them.  Individuals 
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in the ‘no’ category responded at least once no but never yes.  This approach was taken to fully 
utilize the survey data despite low response rates (see Table 2).  The survey questions are 
reported in Table 3.  It is important to note that for (2) received care at a primary care clinic, (5) 
borrowed/skipped bills to pay for health care bills and (6) been refused care because owe for 
prior treatment the question only asked for events within the last six months. 
 A linear model was created to estimate how those individuals with Medicaid coverage 
use the ED differently than those without Medicaid coverage (control) for each of the six 
subgroups.  Each subgroup in turn had two categories composed of those individuals that 
responded yes and those individuals that responded no.  Thus each regression model included 
four estimated values; control-yes, control-no, coverage-yes, and coverage-no.  There were also 
five different dependent variables used: (A) number of ED visits, (B) number of primary care 
preventable ED visits, (C) number of non-emergent ED visits, (D) total ED costs, (E) costs per 
ED visit.  Both (B) number of primary care preventable ED visits and (C) number of non-
emergent ED visits were classified as such by Finkelstein and others (2012) using an algorithm 
developed by Billings and others (2000).  In total there were 30 different linear models that were 
estimated for the heterogeneity study following the equation: 
Dependent Variable = β0 + β1*No + β2*Medicaid Coverage  
+ β3*Medicaid Coverage-No + µ    (3) 
 Interpreting the model values is not straightforward as β1, β2, and β3 each estimate a 
marginal effect.  However, it was important to estimate the effect of Medicaid coverage this way 
in order to insure that statistical significance would be reported.  For example using (A) number 
of ED visits as the dependent variable and (2) usual place of medical care-clinic as the subgroup 
each of the four estimated values (β’s) are interpreted as the following: 
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β0 estimates the number of ED visits by individuals without Medicaid coverage and 
reported that their usual place of care was a clinic.   
β1 estimates the marginal effect that not reporting a clinic as their usual place of care and 
without Medicaid coverage had on the number of ED visits. Thus β0 + β1 estimates the 
number of ED visits by individuals without Medicaid coverage and did not report that 
their usual place of care was a clinic. 
β2 estimates the marginal effect of having Medicaid coverage and reporting a clinic as 
their usual place of care had on ED visits. Thus β0 + β2 estimates the number of ED visits 
by individuals with Medicaid coverage and reported that their usual place of care was a 
clinic. 
β2 + β3 estimates the marginal effects of having Medicaid coverage and not reporting a 
clinic as their usual place of care had on ED visits. Thus β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 estimates the 
number of ED visits by individuals with Medicaid coverage and did not report that their 
usual place of care was a clinic. 
 In addition to studying the effect of Medicaid on ED use and cost, it was also crucial to 
model the causal effect of winning the lottery; an intent-to-treat analysis (Gupta 2011, Taubman, 
et al. 2014).  This approach avoids over optimistic results or implications of the lottery (Gupta 
2011).  This means that the intent-to-treat included all individuals who were given the 
opportunity to sign up for Medicaid as the control variable.  In contrast with the effect of 
Medicaid coverage in which only individuals who won the lottery and signed up for Medicaid or 
obtained Medicaid another way were considered the control. The intent-to-treat analysis was 
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conducted using the same model as the Medicaid coverage analysis and is interpreted in the same 
manner. 
Dependent Variable = β0 + β1*No + β2*Lottery + β2*Lottery-No + µ   (4) 
 The last aspect of the study centers on a lapse by Taubman and others (2014) in 
reporting the heterogeneity between the following subpopulations: gender and age.  As there is 
no underlining statistical test to demonstrate that the values are significantly different.  This 
study used the same linear model as before for the entire subpopulation in order to test if there 
was a statistical significance between men and women with Medicaid coverage and older and 
younger individuals with Medicaid coverage.  Thus the linear model estimates are: 
Number of ED Visits = β0 + β1*Female + β2*Medicaid Coverage  
+ β3*Medicaid Coverage*Female + µ   (5) 
Dependent Variable = β0 + β1*Younger + β2*Medicaid Coverage  
+ β3*Medicaid Coverage*Younger + µ  (6) 
 
Results: 
 The base part of the study was the intent-to-treat analysis that measured the effect the 
lottery had on ED use and outcomes.  For the first three dependent variables (number of ED 
visits, number of primary care preventable ED visits, and the number of non-emergent ED visits) 
the marginal effect of the lottery was statistically significant but much smaller than the marginal 
effect estimated with Medicaid coverage (see Tables 6, 7, and 8).  However for the cost 
dependent variables (total ED costs and cost per ED visit) the marginal effect of the lottery was 
more often than not statistically insignificant (see Tables 9 and 10).  
12 
 
 The main part of the study focused on using an instrumental variable approach to 
generate a Medicaid coverage variable (the 1st stage least squares regression).  The various 
effects of the lottery and household size on Medicaid coverage for the different dependent 
variables are reported in Table 5.  Three dependent variables, the number of ED visits 
individuals who won the lottery, variables number of primary care preventable ED visits, and the 
number of non-emergent ED visits all estimated that individuals who were selected in the lottery 
and the same household size as those who were not selected were 29 percent more likely to have 
had Medicaid coverage. The dependent variables regarding costs (total ED costs and cost per ED 
visit) showed a similar trend with 32% and 33% increase respectively. The final two dependent 
variables, gender and age, had the same estimated increase of 25%, due to the fact that both were 
not based on the restricted survey data ED sample. In all cases the estimated coefficient on 
household size was negative, suggesting that for the survey response ED subsample a larger 
household size decrease by 4-7% an individual’s likelihood of receiving Medicaid coverage (see 
Table 5).  This may be due to the income restrictions or other factors dependent on household 
size.  Individual who did not win the lottery did still have a 19-29% chance of receiving 
Medicaid coverage due to previous factors mentioned such as pregnancy and/or disability (see 
Table 5). 
 Table 6 shows the relationship between the number of ED visits and Medicaid coverage. 
Consistent with the research done by Taubman and others (2014) there was heterogeneity within 
the censored ED visits sample as the dependent variable.  However, the ED/survey sample 
estimate for the effect of Medicaid coverage was larger (0.650 as opposed to 0.401) (Taubman, 
et al. 2014).  This estimate means that for the censored sample the effect of Medicaid coverage 
increased ED visits by 0.650 above the estimated average for the control group of 0.734 (a 90% 
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increase).  Expanding to the intent-to-treat study the marginal effect of the lottery was much 
smaller than the marginal effect of Medicaid coverage (0.098 than 0.650 and 11% than 90%, see 
Table 4).  
 Further analysis of ED visits in the six subgroups had the following results (see Table 6). 
All marginal effects of Medicaid coverage were positive and ranged from a 0.767 to 2.228 
increase in ED visits.  Both groups of clinical use (usual place for medical care and received care 
at a primary care clinic) showed an increase in ED visits with Medicaid coverage (0.0695 and 0 
83 respectively).  However, having Medicaid coverage and not having a clinic as a usual place of 
care was not statistically different from those who had Medicaid coverage and have a clinic as a 
usual place of care. Yet, from the same data set, individuals who had Medicaid coverage and did 
not report receiving care at a primary care clinic visited the ED 0.585 times less than individuals 
who had Medicaid coverage and received care at a primary care clinic.  This is interesting as 
primary care users are typically associated with using the ED less rather than more.  
 The most prominent result from the ED visits focused study came from individuals who 
reported having been refused care because they owed money for past treatment.  Such 
individuals who received Medicaid coverage visited the ED 193% more than similar individuals 
who did not have Medicaid coverage (an on average increase of 2.228 ED visits).  Individuals 
who did not report being refused care and had Medicaid coverage used the ED much less (1.7200 
than their counterparts with Medicaid coverage.  It is important to note that the same size was 
very small for individuals who reported being refused care because they owed money for past 
treatment (840 total or 8.3% with 595 having Medicaid coverage and 245 not having Medicaid 
coverage, see Table 1).  However, despite the small sample size both estimates were statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
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 Table 7 shows the next dependent variable included in the study; the number of ED visits 
that were emergent but primary care preventable.  The censored ED sample estimate for the 
effect of Medicaid coverage was 0.255 above the control of 0.248 (103%).  Like before, every 
estimate of the effect of Medicaid coverage within the six subgroups was positive and 
statistically significant.  The most important subgroups to consider are those that reported 
receiving care at a primary care clinic and those who had a clinic as their usual place of care.  
Primary care medicine could have a negligible effect on the other dependent variables (number 
of ED visits, non-emergent ED visits, ED costs and costs per ED visits), but it most likely could 
affect primary care preventable ED visits.  However, Medicaid coverage increased primary care 
preventable ED visits for both groups associated with primary care, place of care clinic and 
received care at a primary care clinic, 0.266 and 0.314 respectively.  Focusing on just individuals 
with Medicaid coverage, those that reported receiving care at a primary care clinic used the ED 
for primary care preventable needs 0.242 more times.  
 Results of ED visits that were classified as non-emergent are found in Table 8.  Similar to 
the prior two ED use types there was a positive estimated effect of Medicaid coverage in all six 
subgroups.  The effect of Medicaid coverage for the censored ED sample was 0.181 more than 
non-emergent ED visits.  The subgroup with the largest effect of Medicaid coverage was 
individuals who had been refused care with an estimate of 0.534 more non-emergent ED visit 
(206%).  The subgroup of individuals taking prescription medication also has interesting results.  
Individuals who did not have Medicaid coverage but were taking prescription medication used 
the ED 69% (0.140) more than individuals without Medicaid coverage and not taking 
prescription medication.  
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Lastly, while understanding the effect of Medicaid coverage on the number of ED visits 
is important, it is also crucial to understand how Medicaid coverage affects cost.  Table 9 shows 
how ED costs changed with Medicaid coverage for the censored ED sample and the six 
subgroups.  For the censored ED sample, the average total ED costs for the control group was 
$3,469.04. The effect of Medicaid coverage was statistically significant at the 10% level and 
estimated a $1,055.06 increase in ED costs.  The marginal effects of Medicaid coverage in all of 
six subgroups were statistically significant and ranged from $1,459.72 to $4,594.16.  The largest 
of which came again from individuals who reported being refused care because they could not 
pay, a 122% increase.  This is very interesting and could demonstrate how delayed care (because 
of financial constraints) could further increase medical costs due to costly ED care. 
Further analysis of ED costs looks at how cost per ED visits differed with Medicaid 
coverage (see Table 10).  The increase number of visits was clearly shown thus it is important to 
remove such effects and look at the cost savings Medicaid coverage may have.  However, none 
of the subgroups or even the entire censored ED sample had a statistically significant estimated 
effect of Medicaid coverage.  Moreover, all estimates for the control group were statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  This solidifies that Medicaid coverage did not increase or decrease 
ED costs per visit.  
 The final part of the study looked at the claim by Taubman and others (2014) that men 
and younger individuals utilized the ED more when they received Medicaid.  However, there 
was not a statistically significant difference between males and females with Medicaid coverage 
in ED visits (see Table 11).  The same is true for younger and older individuals with Medicaid 
coverage.  There was a statistically significant increase (0.133) for younger individuals without 
Medicaid coverage than older individuals without Medicaid coverage.  This suggests just 
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comparing the estimated marginal effects of Medicaid coverage for the two variables is not 
enough to infer that they are statistically different.  However, estimating the marginal effects 
within a subgroup may provide statistically significant estimates. 
 
Discussion: 
 The purpose of this study was to estimate the causal effect of Medicaid coverage.  It was 
shown that Medicaid coverage increased ED use for all ED visit types as well as those that were 
primary care preventable and non-emergent.  Six subgroups were studied based on survey 
responses.  In all cases for the three groups of ED visit types Medicaid coverage increased use. 
The largest increase in ED use came from individuals who reported being refused care because 
they owed money for previous treatment and received Medicaid coverage.  Further study is 
needed in order to fully understand why Medicaid coverage had such an impact.  One possibility 
may be that delaying care due to financial constraints encouraged such individuals to seek care at 
the ED.  Medicaid coverage further increases this behavior (presenting at the ED) by 122% to 
262% depending on the ED visit type.   
 Focusing on how individuals with Medicaid coverage differed within subgroups also 
provides interesting results.  For example in the case of individuals with Medicaid coverage that 
responded to the survey question about whether they received care at a primary care clinic in the 
past six months a marginal effect was observed.  Individuals who reported receiving care at a 
primary care clinic used the ED for primary care preventable ED visits 0.242 more times than 
individuals who did not report receiving care at a primary care clinic. 
Interestingly, Medicaid coverage did not decrease costs per ED visits.  However, it is 
important to recognize the limits of this study.  Most notably, the Oregon study is not readily 
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generalizable to the entire US.  Specifically the Affordable Care Act mandates participation and 
in the Oregon lottery participation was voluntary.  Thus the Affordable Care Act may more 
closely resemble the intent-to-treat analysis included in this study.  In this regard, the effect of 
the lottery was occasionally statistically significant.  Furthermore, the duration of this study was 
very short (a mere 18 months) and the long term effect of Medicaid coverage on ED use and cost 
cannot be explained. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Groups by Medicaid Coverage and Lottery 
 
 N 
Medicaid 
Coverage 
No 
Coverage Lottery No Lottery 
       
Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment 
 74922 
18013 
(24%) 
56909 
(76.0%) 
29834 
(39.8 %) 
45088 
(60.2 %) 
       
Emergency Department 
Sample 
 24646 
5929 
(24.1%) 
18717 
(75.9%) 
9626 
(39.1 %) 
15020 
(60.9 %) 
       
Usual place for medical care- 
Clinic 
Yes 
10058 
1791 
(17.8%) 
3338 
(33.2%) 
2727 
(27.1%) 
2402 
(23.9%) 
No 
1028 
(10.2%) 
3901 
(38.8%) 
2343 
(23.3%) 
2586 
(25.7%) 
       
Received care at a primary 
care clinic 
Yes 
10413 
2236 
(21.5%) 
4639 
(44.6%) 
3540 
(34.0%) 
3335 
(32.0%) 
No 
699 
(6.7%) 
2839 
(27.3%) 
1706 
(16.4%) 
1832 
(17.6%) 
       
Currently taking any 
prescription medications 
Yes 
9604 
1759 
(18.3%) 
3542 
(36.9%) 
2688 
(28.0%) 
2613 
(27.2%) 
No 
976 
(10.2%) 
3327 
(34.6%) 
2179 
(22.7%) 
2124 
(22.1%) 
       
Currently owe money for 
medical expenses 
Yes 
10397 
1908 
(18.4%) 
4747 
(45.7%) 
3258 
(31.3%) 
3397 
(32.7%) 
No 
1029 
(9.9%) 
2713 
(26.1%) 
1979 
(19.0%) 
1763 
(17.0%) 
       
Borrowed money/skipped bills 
to pay health care costs 
Yes 
10373 
1236 
(11.9%) 
3386 
(32.6%) 
2268 
(21.9%) 
2354 
(22.7%) 
No 
1688 
(16.3%) 
4063 
(39.2%) 
2957 
(28.5%) 
2794 
(26.9%) 
       
Been refused care because 
owe money for past treatment 
Yes 
10137 
245 
(2.4%) 
595 
(5.9%) 
403 
(4.0%) 
437 
(4.3) 
No 
2624 
(25.9%) 
6673 
(65.8%) 
4733 
(46.7%) 
4564 
(45.0%) 
       
Gender 
Male 
24622 
2167 
(8.8%) 
8993 
(36.5%) 
4461 
(18.1%) 
6699 
(27.2%) 
Female 
3749 
(15.2%) 
9713 
(39.4%) 
5151 
(20.9%) 
8311 
(33.8%) 
       
Age 
Old* 
24622 
1428 
(5.8%) 
4773 
(19.4%) 
2380 
(9.7%) 
3821 
(15.5%) 
Young* 
4488 
(18.2%) 
13933 
(56.6%) 
7232 
(29.4%) 
11189 
(45.4%) 
       
Note: The percentages are calculated by dividing the number of observations by the number in the entire group.  
* For the group age, old represents individuals 50 and older at the start of the study while young represents 
individuals 49 and younger at the start of the study. 
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Table 2: Survey Response Rates  
  0M 6M 12M 
     
Returned Survey Yes 26,423 6,359 23,777 
  ( 45.2% ) ( 54.1% ) ( 40.7% ) 
     
 No 31,982 5,397 34,628 
  ( 54.8% ) ( 45.9% )  ( 59.3% ) 
     
Total Number of 
Surveys Sent 
 
58,405 11,756 58,405 
     
Note: The same 58,405 individuals sent the 0M survey were also sent the 12M survey.  This 
included 29,589 treatment individuals and 28, 816 control individuals.  For the 6M survey a 
subsample (11,756) which focused on early respondents to the OM survey.  The 
supplementary materials provided with the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment Public Use 
Data report that the 6M returned surveys (6,359) had a weighted or effective response rate of 
42 percent. 
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Table 3: Survey Questions 
Term used in paper 
and tables 
Question per surveys Notes 
   
Usual place for 
medical care- Clinic 
Where do you usually go to receive medical 
care? Mark only one.  
-A private doctor’s office or clinic 
-A public health clinic, community health center, 
or tribal clinic 
-A hospital-based clinic 
-A hospital emergency room 
-An urgent care clinic 
-Some other place not listed here; Where? 
-I don’t have a usual place 
Yes if response a private doctor’s 
office or clinic, a public health 
clinic, community health center, or 
tribal clinic or a hospital-based 
clinic. 
No if response all others. 
   
Received care at a 
primary care clinic 
In the last 6 months, how many times did you go 
to a doctor’s office, clinic, or other health care 
provider to get care for yourself? Don’t include 
emergency room or hospital visits. Your best 
estimate is fine. 
-None 
-1 time 
-2times 
3 or more times (how many?:_______) 
Yes if response a number greater 
than 0.  
No if response 0. 
   
Currently taking any 
prescription 
medications 
How many different prescription medications are 
you currently taking? 
Yes if response a number greater 
than 0. 
No if response 0. 
   
Currently owe money 
for medical expenses 
Do you currently owe money to a health care 
provider, credit card company, or anyone else for 
medical expenses?  
-Yes  
-No 
 
   
Borrowed 
money/skipped bills to 
pay health care costs 
In the last 6 months, have you had to borrow 
money, skip paying other bills, or pay other bills 
late in order to pay health care bills? 
-Yes 
-No 
 
   
Been refused care 
because owe money 
for past treatment 
In the last 6 months, has a doctor, clinic, or 
medial service refused to treat you because you 
owed money to them for past treatment? 
-Yes 
-No 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
 
Number of ED Visits 24622 0.907 2.204 0 22 
      
Number of Primary 
Care Preventable ED 
Visits 24626 0.320 0.921 0 16.429 
      
Number of Non-
Emergent ED Visits 24634 0.193 0.681 0 13.639 
      
 
Total ED Costs  8449 3874.57 5644.60 2.00 67984.55 
      
 
Costs per ED Visit 8437 1455.48 1326.12 0.00 18917.80 
      
Note:  As the number of PC preventable and non-emergent ED visits were calculated using an 
algorithm by Billings and others (2000), non-integer values were possible (i.e., the maximum 
values were not integer values due to the algorithm used).  
The number of ED visits was truncated to 22 ED visits in order insure that there were at least 
10 observation per number of ED visit by Finkelstein (2013).  In addition to the truncation of 
the number of ED visits, 24 observations were censored to insure de-identification.  
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Table 5: Instrumental Variables 
 
N Intercept Lottery 
Household 
Size 
     
 
Number of ED Visits 10449 
0.21658 
(0.013) 
0.28756 
(0.008) 
-0.06253 
(0.009) 
     
Number of Primary Care 
Preventable ED Visits 10451 
0.21678 
(0.013) 
0.28731 
(0.008) 
-0.06281 
(0.009) 
     
Number of Non-
Emergent ED Visits 10454 
0.21678 
(0.013) 
0.28748 
(0.008) 
-0.06286 
(0.009) 
     
 
Total ED Costs  3482 
0.29352 
(0.025) 
0.31652 
(0.016) 
-0.06772 
(0.020) 
     
 
Costs per ED Visit 3479 
0.29377 
(0.025) 
0.32645 
(0.016) 
-0.06782 
(0.020) 
     
Censored ED                                                          
(Gender/Age) 24622 
0.19116 
(0.008) 
0.24703 
(0.005) 
-0.03927 
(0.007) 
     
Note:  All values significant at the 1% level.  These values represent the 1st stage least 
square regression of lottery and household size on Medicaid coverage. 
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Table 6: Heterogeneity of Number of ED Visits 
   Number of ED Visits 
   
Control 
Effect of Medicaid 
Coverage 
 Intent-to-Treat 
    Control 
Effect of 
Lottery 
         
Censored ED Sample  0.724 0.650 90%  0.858 0.098 
   (0.047)*** (0.149)***   (0.031)*** (0.043)** 
         
Usual place for medical care – 
Clinic  0.770 0.695   0.909 0.118 
   (0.067)*** (0.206)*** 90%  (0.043)*** (0.059)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.086 -0.149   -0.103 -0.059 
   (0.095) (0.301)   (0.061)* (0.086) 
         
Received care at a primary care 
clinic  0.843 0.783 93%  0.998 0.135 
   (0.059)*** (0.183)***   (0.038)*** (0.053)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.305 -0.585   -0.397 -0.153 
   (0.099)*** (0.316)*   (0.064)*** (0.091)* 
         
Currently taking any prescription 
medications  0.987 0.767 78%  1.139 0.134 
   (0.062)*** (0.193)***   (0.039)*** (0.055)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.614 -0.386   -0.687 -0.078 
   (0.095)*** (0.300)   (0.061)*** (0.086) 
         
Currently owe money for 
medical expenses  0.950 0.953 100%  1.128 0.183 
   (0.058)*** (0.184)***   (0.037)*** (0.053)*** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.671 -0.703   -0.794 -0.151 
   (0.098)*** (0.306)**   (0.063)*** (0.088)* 
         
Borrowed money/skipped bills 
to pay health care bills  0.944 0.828 88%  1.102 0.151 
   (0.070)*** (0.222)***   (0.045)*** (0.064)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.412 -0.284   -0.453 -0.077 
   (0.095)*** (0.299)   (0.061)*** (0.086) 
         
Been refused care because owe 
money for past treatment  1.152 2.228 193%  1.513 0.532 
   (0.137)*** (0.446)***   (0.088)*** (0.129)*** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.495 -1.720   -0.744 -0.469 
   (0.146)*** (0.473)***   (0.093)*** (0.136)*** 
         
Note:  The percentages indicated in the table under the Effect of Medicaid Coverage represents the percent 
increase in ED visits by individuals with Medicaid coverage above the control.  *** Significant at the 1 Percent 
Level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
N = 10449 
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Table 7: Heterogeneity of Number of Primary Care Preventable ED Visits 
   Number of PC Preventable ED Visits 
   
Control 
Effect of Medicaid 
Coverage 
 Intent-to-Treat 
    Control 
Effect of 
Lottery 
         
Censored ED Sample  0.248 0.255 103%  0.299 0.042 
   (0.020)*** (0.062)***   (0.013)*** (0.018)** 
         
Usual place for medical care – 
Clinic  0.259 0.266 103%  0.310 0.049 
   (0.028)*** (0.086)***   (0.018)*** (0.025)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.019 -0.035   -0.021 -0.019 
   (0.040) (0.126)   (0.026) (0.036) 
         
Received care at a primary care 
clinic  0.288 0.314 109%  0.348 0.058 
   (0.025)*** (0.077)***   (0.016)*** (0.022)*** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.100 -0.242   -0.138 -0.063 
   (0.041)** (0.132)*   (0.027)*** (0.038)* 
         
Currently taking any prescription 
medications  0.326 0.311 95%  0.386 0.057 
   (0.026)*** (0.081)***   (0.017)*** (0.023)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.181 -0.166   -0.211 -0.036 
   (0.040)*** (0.126)   (0.026)*** (0.036) 
         
Currently owe money for 
medical expenses  0.323 0.384 119%  0.392 0.077 
   (0.024)*** (0.077)***   (0.016)*** (0.022)*** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.221 -0.306   -0.273 -0.069 
   (0.041)*** (0.129)**   (0.027)*** (0.037)* 
         
Borrowed money/skipped bills 
to pay health care bills  0.319 0.338 106%  0.382 0.066 
   (0.029)*** (0.093)***   (0.019)*** (0.027)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.133 -0.135   -0.153 -0.037 
   (0.040)*** (0.125)   (0.026)*** (0.036) 
         
Been refused care because owe 
money for past treatment  0.380 0.997 262%  0.538 0.245 
   (0.058)*** (0.186)***   (0.037)*** (0.054)*** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.153 -0.812   -0.271 -0.223 
   (0.061)** (0.198)***   (0.039)*** (0.057)*** 
         
Note:  The percentages indicated in the table under the Effect of Medicaid Coverage represents the percent 
increase in PC preventable ED visits by individuals with Medicaid coverage above the control.   *** Significant 
at the 1 Percent Level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
N = 10451 
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of Number of Non-Emergent ED Visits 
   Number of Non-Emergent ED Visits 
   
Control 
Effect of Medicaid 
Coverage 
 Intent-to-Treat 
    Control 
Effect of 
Lottery 
         
Censored ED Sample  0.142 0.181 127%  0.176 0.033 
   (0.015)*** (0.046)***   (0.009)*** (0.013)** 
         
Usual place for medical care – 
Clinic  0.149 0.192 129%  0.184 0.039 
   (0.021)*** (0.064)***   (0.013)*** (0.018)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.013 -0.033   -0.016 -0.014 
   (0.029) (0.093)   (0.019) (0.027) 
         
Received care at a primary care 
clinic  0.167 0.198 119%  0.203 0.040 
   (0.018)*** (0.057)***   (0.012)*** (0.016)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.063 -0.087   -0.075 -0.027 
   (0.031)** (0.098)   (0.020)*** (0.028) 
         
Currently taking any prescription 
medications  0.202 0.193 96%  0.238 0.037 
   (0.019)*** (0.060)***   (0.012)*** (0.017)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.140 -0.053   -0.151 -0.008 
   (0.030)*** (0.093)   (0.019)*** (0.027) 
         
Currently owe money for 
medical expenses  0.195 0.250 128%  0.239 0.053 
   (0.018)*** (0.057)***   (0.012)*** (0.016)*** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.155 -0.162   -0.184 -0.035 
   (0.030)*** (0.095)*   (0.020)*** (0.028) 
         
Borrowed money/skipped bills 
to pay health care bills  0.202 0.189 94%  0.237 0.036 
   (0.022)*** (0.069)***   (0.014)*** (0.020)* 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.112 -0.005   -0.114 -0.000 
   (0.029)*** (0.093)   (0.019)*** (0.026) 
         
Been refused care because owe 
money for past treatment  0.259 0.534 206%  0.345 0.128 
   (0.043)*** (0.138)***   (0.027)*** (0.040)*** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -0.135 -0.383   -0.191 -0.101 
   (0.045)*** (0.147)***   (0.029)*** (0.042)** 
         
Note:  The percentages indicated in the table under the Effect of Medicaid Coverage represents the percent 
increase in Non-Emergent ED visits by individuals with Medicaid coverage above the control.   *** Significant at 
the 1 Percent Level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
N = 10454 
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Table 9: Heterogeneity of ED Costs 
   Total ED Costs 
   
Control 
Effect of Medicaid 
Coverage 
 Intent-to-Treat 
    Control 
Effect of 
Lottery 
         
Censored ED Sample  3469.04 1055.06 30%  3752.19 230.18 
   (242.24)*** (587.31)*   (136.24)*** (191.25) 
         
Usual place for medical care – 
Clinic  3554.43 1511.75 43%  3917.39 382.33 
   (332.85)*** (808.75)*   (185.61)*** (255.52) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -138.16 -1119.56   -357.26 -403.59 
   (494.32) (1222.84)   (272.96) (385.29) 
         
Received care at a primary care 
clinic  3648.42 1299.56 36%  3989.42 294.71 
   (286.36)*** (700.00) *   (158.82)*** (220.666) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -599.16 -1241.46   -871.36 -388.55 
   (556.41) (1393.01)   (306.33)*** (439.09) 
         
Currently taking any 
prescription medications  3745.92 1628.90 43%  4156.69 392.59 
   (286.39)*** (707.18)**   (157.72)*** (222.61)* 
 Marginal Effect – No  -1102.44 -1746.68   -1508.05 -487.38 
   (545.95)** (1340.53)   (304.54)*** (423.81) 
         
Currently owe money for 
medical expenses  3527.31 1637.26 46%  3936.62 399.66 
   (269.40)*** (668.69)**   (148.20)*** (210.62)* 
 Marginal Effect – No  -658.15 -2098.67   -1129.64 -607.45 
   (648.74) (1559.80)   (366.77)*** (494.44) 
         
Borrowed money/skipped bills 
to pay health care bills  3683.31 1459.72 40%  4057.76 333.72 
   (329.30)*** (821.26)*   (181.71)*** (259.26) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -563.12 -588.90   -694.09 -166.47 
   (494.73) (1216.25)   (273.87)** (383.32) 
         
Been refused care because owe 
money for past treatment  3781.15 4594.16 122%  4897.33 1163.56 
   (597.67)*** (1513.25)***   (327.61)*** (477.35)** 
 Marginal Effect – No  -438.77 -3983.77   -1380.11 -1057.00 
   (654.87) (1649.42)**   (359.66)*** (520.28)** 
         
Note:  The percentages indicated in the table under the Effect of Medicaid Coverage represents the percent 
increase in ED costs by individuals with Medicaid coverage above the control.   *** Significant at the 1 Percent 
Level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
N = 3482 
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Table 10: Heterogeneity of Costs per ED Visit 
   Costs per ED Visit 
   
Control 
Effect of Medicaid 
Coverage 
 Intent-to-Treat 
    Control 
Effect of 
Lottery 
         
Censored ED Sample  1491.74 -95.64 -  1472.32 -33.19 
   (57.11)*** (138.45)   (32.03)*** (44.97) 
         
Usual place for medical care - 
Clinic  1601.33 -217.82 -  1552.73 -67.04 
   (77.16)*** (184.44)   (43.62)*** (60.07) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -231.52 235.71   -174.02 62.34 
   (114.58)** (278.92)   (64.17)*** (90.60) 
         
Received care at a primary care 
clinic  1531.74 -123.21 -  1503.89 -37.29 
   (66.59)*** (160.15)   (37.45)*** (52.04) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -139.48 61.49   -117.39 1.65 
   (129.31) (318.56)   (72.21) (103.51) 
         
Currently taking any prescription 
medications  1520.53 -36.47 -  1510.58 -7.67 
   (66.94)*** (162.65)   (37.39)*** (52.78) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -110.64 -195.53   -142.58 -81.71 
   (127.61) (308.24)   (72.17)** (100.43) 
         
Currently owe money for 
medical expenses  1507.34 -86.09 -  1490.16 -30.65 
   (62.76)*** (153.31)   (35.02)*** (49.77) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -106.91 6.12   -109.19 9.27 
   (151.21) (357.54)   (86.63) (116.79) 
         
Borrowed money/skipped bills 
to pay health care bills  1498.83 -70.34 -  1481.59 -18.41 
   (76.53)*** (187.76)   (42.83)*** (61.10) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -18.43 -46.67   -21.04 -29.61 
   (114.97) (278.12)   (64.54) (90.35) 
         
Been refused care because owe 
money for past treatment  1704.38 -379.69 -  1634.61 -147.73 
   (39.78)*** (348.37)   (77.70)*** (113.23) 
 Marginal Effect – No  -257.55 348.43   -195.48 139.51 
   (153.13)* (379.61)   (85.28)** (123.38) 
         
Note:  The percent increase in costs per ED visit was not calculated as there was no statistical significance.  *** 
Significant at the 1 Percent Level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
N = 3479 
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Table 9: Heterogeneity of  ED Visits by Gender and Age 
   Number of ED Visits 
   
Control 
Effect of Medicaid 
Coverage 
 Intent-to-Treat 
    Control 
Effect of 
Lottery 
         
Censored ED Sample  0.944 0.224 24%  1.002 -0.011 
   (0.035)*** (0.129)*   (0.020)*** (0.031) 
         
Gender  0.887 0.348 39%  0.989 0.007 
   (0.52)*** (0.192)*   (0.30)*** (0.047) 
 Marginal Effect – Female  0.102 -0.224   0.060 -0.032 
   (0.070) (0.260)   (0.040) (0.063) 
         
Age (50 and older)  0.844 0.241 -  0.896 0.014 
   (0.070)*** (0.258)   (0.039)*** (0.063) 
 Marginal Effect – Younger  0.133 -0.025   0.141 -0.035 
 (49 and younger)  (0.080)* (0.298)   (0.045)*** (0.073) 
         
Note:  The percentages indicated in the table under the Effect of Medicaid Coverage represents the percent 
increase in ED visits by individuals with Medicaid coverage above the control.  The dash indicates that there was 
not statistical significance and the percent increase was not calculated.  *** Significant at the 1 Percent Level, ** 
Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level 
N = 24622 
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